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Guidelines, law, and governance: disconnects in the global 
control of airline-associated infectious diseases
Andrea Grout, Natasha Howard, Richard Coker, Elizabeth M Speakman
International air travel is increasingly affecting the epidemiology of infectious diseases. A particular public health, 
economic, and political concern is the role of air travel in bringing infectious passengers or vectors to previously 
non-endemic areas. Yet, little research has been done to investigate either the infection risks associated with air 
travel or the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of infection control measures on aircraft and at borders. We 
briefly review the interface between international and national legislation, policy, and guidelines in the context of 
existing infection risks and possible scenarios. We have found that public health guidance and legislation, which 
airlines are required to follow, are often contradictory and confusing. Infection control measures for air travel 
need to be underpinned by coherent and enforceable national and international legislation that is based on solid 
epidemiological evidence. We recommend further research investment into more effective on-board vector control, 
health screening, and risk communications strategies, and the development of enforceable and harmonised 
international legislation.
Introduction
Low air fares and a multitude of social and economic 
factors have resulted in increased air travel. The number 
of journeys taken by passengers each year has grown 
from approximately 642 million in 1980 to more than 
3·4 billion in 2015.1 The epidemiology of infectious 
diseases associated with air travel and the challenges of 
infection control are important public health concerns, 
yet they are scarcely discussed in the literature.2 Aircraft 
can now travel to almost any part of the world within 
24 h, and can enable spread of infection either by in-
flight infection transmission or by transporting infectious 
passengers or vectors—eg, malaria-infected mos-
quitoes—from endemic to non-endemic regions, thus 
putting populations in destination countries at risk. The 
combination of rising passenger numbers, new travel 
destinations, and on-board transmission events can 
influence transmission patterns of several imported 
diseases, including severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and 
Ebola virus disease.3 For example, the ongoing 
transmission of Zika virus disease is believed to have 
been introduced to the Americas by air travel.4 
Management of these risks requires knowledge of the 
dynamics of infectious disease transmission and the 
potential effectiveness of control measures, suggesting 
that frontline employees (eg, airline staff) would need 
appropriate training to handle suspected disease cases.
As a result of experiences with SARS, the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA) issued the Emergency 
Response Plan and Action Checklist, which consists of 
guidelines and best practices for aircrews during public 
health emergencies.5 To reduce the risk of on-board 
disease transmission, the US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) provides cabin crews with 
information on general infection control measures and 
guidelines to identify ill and potentially infectious 
passengers.6 Passengers with certain conditions—for 
example, someone recovering from measles—might 
require medical clearance; however, guidelines for these 
conditions vary between countries and can be subject to 
individual airline policy.7
The effectiveness of infectious disease response 
strategies largely depends on prompt identification of 
cases.8 Current measures, such as entry and exit screening, 
isolation, quarantine, and travel health information might 
not be feasible or sufficient to control infectious disease 
transmission. For example, the value of entry screening 
measures has been questioned,9,10 while an evaluation of 
border entry screening measures in several countries 
concluded that a combination of communication methods 
(eg, in the form of pre-flight health information, in-flight 
videos, and clinical guidance) for passengers and 
clinicians might be a more effective strategy for global 
infectious disease control.11 Collectively, the unique 
dynamics and interactions at play in an aircraft 
environment require a distinct response to infectious 
disease control.
In this Personal View, we consider the disconnects 
between global health law, national jurisdictions, 
organisational guidelines, and aircrew compliance by 
discussing existing risks and presenting two infection 
scenarios based on current airline practice.12
Infection risks
In-flight transmission
Although the risk of disease transmission exists 
whenever people congregate in confined spaces, aircraft 
are unique in having individuals from often diverse 
geographical regions, with differing population 
immunity and exposure risks, interacting with aircrews 
and each other.6 Infection can occur via direct trans-
mission through contact with skin, blood, or other bodily 
fluids (eg, Ebola virus), or via indirect transmission 
without person-to-person contact. Indirect transmission 
on an airplane can occur through infectious droplets (eg, 
influenza virus), through contaminated surfaces or 
objects (eg, meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus), or 
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via vectors such as mosquitoes, flies, and fleas (eg, 
malaria and leishmaniasis).
Long-distance air travel in particular exposes 
passengers to several factors that could affect disease 
transmission. The transmission characteristics of a 
pathogen, ambient climatic conditions, time spent on 
board, and aircraft type can affect quantification of the 
general transmission risk.13 Absolute figures for the risk 
of in-flight disease transmission are therefore not readily 
available and the evidence base is inadequate.14 Mangili 
and Gendreau2 reported in-flight transmission of 
influenza, SARS, tuberculosis, measles, smallpox, and 
other pathogens. On a 3 h flight from Hong Kong to 
Beijing in 2003, 16 of 120 passengers were infected with 
the SARS virus by a single ill passenger,15 while modelling 
has demonstrated the possibility of in-flight transmission 
of MERS coronavirus.16
Protective measures are in place in modern aircraft, 
but these measures are not necessarily as robust as 
assumed. For example, commercial aircraft use high-
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters to restrict 
exposure to small airborne particles. However, there are 
no regulations requiring that HEPA filters be in place, 
and little testing has taken place to assess the effectiveness 
of these filters.17
Carriage of infectious passengers or vectors
In 2014, Ebola virus disease was brought to the USA,18 the 
UK,19 and Nigeria20 by undiagnosed infected people 
aboard aircraft. Brownstein and colleagues21 demon-
strated the effect of air travel on the global spread of 
seasonal influenza, noting that decreased air traffic 
following the terrorist attacks of Sept 11, 2001, was 
associated with a delayed influenza season. Maloney and 
Cetron22 documented the air-travel-associated trans-
mission of meningococcal disease. Global air travel could 
spur the spread of epidemics by bringing viruses and 
parasites to new areas.23 Infected mosquitoes on 
intercontinental flights are believed to have contributed 
to the global spread of malaria.23,24 West Nile virus is 
widely suspected to have been spread to the USA by an 
infected mosquito carried by plane.24 Similarly, the 
introduction of Zika virus to the Americas coincided with 
an upsurge of air travel to Brazil from endemic countries 
in 2013.4
Management of the risk of transporting infected 
passengers requires knowledge of transmission 
dynamics and the potential effectiveness of airport entry 
and exit screening measures, the ability to appropriately 
isolate or quarantine individual passengers on an aircraft, 
and adequately trained aircrew who are able to identify 
signs of infection and take appropriate measures. For 
example, WHO maintains that the risk of vector-borne 
diseases being transmitted aboard aircraft is low,25 but 
recommends aircraft disinsection (a public health 
measure involving insecticide treatment of aircraft 
interiors and holds),25 stating that “there have been 
frequent instances of insects of public health importance 
being introduced from one country to another, with 
occasional dire consequences”.23 However, the effective-
ness of disinsection is unclear.26 Minimisation of the risk 
of inadvertently carrying insect vectors requires con-
sistent use of effective control measures, including 
insecticides that are safe for frequent aircrew and 
passenger exposure.
Legislation and guidance
Public health measures for international air travel 
include a range of national and international legislative 
tools, policies, and guidelines. Globally, 196 countries 
signed the legally binding International Health 
Regulations (IHRs), with the aim of controlling global 
disease spread.27 However, the only IHR provision 
relating to air travel is the requirement that all chief 
pilots provide a brief aircraft general declaration on 
passenger health to ground staff before disembarkation.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
and IATA coordinate with WHO and provide recom-
mendations, but specific controls are left to the discretion 
of individual countries. National guidance and legislation 
are uncoordinated across countries, and—with no strong 
evidence underpinning control measures—they are 
often inconsistent. Following the SARS epidemic, IATA 
recommended that all air carriers create an emergency 
response plan for public health emergencies, but these 
are only guidelines and legislative powers lie with 
national authorities.5 Airlines face conflicting obligations, 
since they must comply with infectious disease controls 
in both origin and destination countries.28
Airlines owe a duty of care to three different groups—
passengers, aircrew, and destination country popu-
lations—and these duties sometimes conflict. For 
example, the US Environmental Protection Agency 
prohibits usage of some insecticides because of potential 
risks to aircrew, whereas national laws in Australia and 
New Zealand require usage of these insecticides. US 
airlines flying to these countries must purchase 
insecticides at stopovers, and airline unions have raised 
serious concerns about the “inconsistent and in-
appropriate application”, toxicity, and potential adverse 
health effects of these agents.29 Other airlines have 
reported difficulties in aircraft storage of aerosol 
insecticides that were either banned or prohibited from 
import in some destination countries.30 Additionally, 
doubt exists as to the effectiveness of disinsection, with 
research identifying increasing resistance of mosquitos 
to insecticides.26 Although the ICAO encouraged more 
research into non-chemical disinsection procedures in 
2013,31 procedures have not changed and airplane 
disinsection policies and implementation remain 
inconsistent worldwide.
Airlines and national authorities can refuse to transport 
passengers they consider to be a health risk. The US Air 
Carrier Access Act states that carriage can be refused 
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where a passenger presents with a disease that “is both 
readily transmitted in the course of a flight and which 
has serious health consequences (eg, SARS, but not 
AIDS or a cold)”.32 This rule applies to all flights of US 
carriers and flights to or from the USA, but it clearly 
requires any disease to be diagnosed before the flight. 
Considerable debate continues about the effectiveness 
and practicality of screening passengers at entry, exit, or 
both. Further research must be prioritised before 
national and international legislation can take a 
consistent, evidence-informed approach to screening, 
because flight duration and pathogen transmission 
dynamics are just two important factors that challenge 
one-size-fits-all recommendations.33
Liability
Enforcement of national laws is highly variable, with 
non-compliance carrying financial penalties and criminal 
sanctions in some countries, but little evidence of 
enforcement in others. 191 countries are signatories to 
the Montreal Convention, which imposes obligations to 
protect passengers.34 However, although this convention 
enables compensation claims to be made, proving an 
airline’s liability for a passenger contracting an infectious 
disease during the flight can be challenging evidentially. 
Even if transmission time can be proven, airlines can 
defend the extent to which they should have been 
expected to identify the risk. They can argue that liability 
should lie with the infectious passenger who took the 
flight without notifying the airline or health authorities.35 
Although industrial injury claims have been brought on 
behalf of aircrew for alleged adverse reactions to constant 
insecticide exposure in aircraft, these claims have been 
defended on the basis that airlines were following WHO 
guidelines.36,37
The Montreal Convention does not apply to individuals 
in a destination country who could become infected by a 
passenger or imported vector. Although regulatory 
liability might still exist and personal litigation against an 
airline could be undertaken, proving causal transmission 
will again be very difficult, particularly if the disease in 
question did not become symptomatic until some time 
after the flight had landed.
Scenarios
Two hypothetical scenarios are provided to show the 
potential occurrence and wider implications of disease 
transmission on aircraft.
Scenario 1: direct transmission
Ebola is an infectious and often fatal disease marked 
by fever, nausea, vomiting, and—less frequently—
haemor rhaging, and spread through infected bodily 
fluids. On a flight from Frankfurt to Washington, DC, a 
40-year-old passenger started complaining of a severe 
headache, abdominal pain, nausea, and sweating. He 
recalled no specific symptoms before boarding, but 
claimed he had been feeling generally unwell since his 
arrival from Abuja, an interim stopover on his itinerary 
that had originated in Kampala 2 days earlier. About 3 h 
into the flight, his symptoms worsened and the cabin 
supervisor requested medical assistance. As there was no 
doctor on board, a nurse examined the passenger and, 
suspecting he might be infectious, advised the crew to 
“isolate him as a precautionary measure”. The passenger 
was taken to a seat near the galley and looked after by two 
crew members for the remainder of the flight. 
Meanwhile, he had violent bouts of vomiting and became 
increasingly disoriented. The cabin supervisor notified 
the chief pilot of a sick passenger, but did not 
communicate the severity of his condition. The pilot 
assumed the situation was controlled and did not contact 
US health authorities. Upon landing, the passenger’s 
condition had deteriorated and an ambulance was 
requested. After 24 h, the passenger was determined to 
be positive for Ebola virus.
This scenario demonstrates an absence of com-
munication between crew members and between aircrew 
and ground staff in the destination country. This 
miscommunication delayed notification of a potentially 
severe health risk from infected bodily fluids, such as 
vomit; moreover, an ambulance with infection control 
facilities should have been requested while the plane was 
airborne. This represents non-compliance with IATA 
guidance and a potential criminal breach of US health 
and quarantine laws. US laws are enforceable against 
both individuals and organisations, with penalties 
including fines and imprisonment.38,39
Scenario 2: vector-borne transmission
Vector-borne diseases (eg, malaria, yellow fever, and Zika 
virus) are transmitted by mosquitoes or other vectors to 
human beings, and contribute to a substantial proportion 
of the global infectious disease burden.40 Mosquito 
ecology suggests that aircraft are associated with a higher 
risk of introducing a live infected mosquito than are sea 
or road transport.41 Following national requirements, 
disinsection was carried out by aircrew during descent 
into Mumbai Airport. The flight had originated in 
London. A passenger who regularly travelled on this 
route objected to being sprayed with insecticide, pointing 
to potentially dangerous adverse health effects. He added 
that, having travelled with different airlines, he had not 
witnessed any in-flight spraying for years. On the return 
flight, several passengers complained about the presence 
of mosquitoes in the cabin before take-off. The aircraft 
had been parked on the apron of Mumbai Airport, with 
cabin and cargo doors open during baggage loading and 
passenger embarkation. Passengers demanded protec-
tion from mosquitoes and wondered why spraying was 
done upon entering India, but not upon departure.
This scenario reflects inconsistencies in, and in adequate 
monitoring of, disinsection policy. Indian national law 
requires disinsection on inbound flights, but India is itself 
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a reservoir of vector-borne diseases. Guidance from WHO 
and IATA uses permissive rather than mandatory 
language on disinsection, and thus national policies 
determine whether countries choose to implement 
disinsection consistently for all arriving aircraft or only 
require the process on selected aircraft. Policies are not 
always clear, and it is necessary to balance the fears of 
health risks from both insecticides and mosquitoes.
Conclusions
To be effective, infection control measures for air travel 
need to be underpinned by coherent and enforceable 
national and international legislation that is based on 
solid epidemiological evidence. Since aircrew are not 
infectious disease specialists and would not normally 
have medical training, recognition of potential disease 
cases and adequate communication of an in-flight illness 
remains challenging and ad hoc. The dynamics of 
existing, emerging, and re-emerging infectious patho-
gens mean that infectious diseases will always challenge 
control efforts as pathogens exploit novel evolutionary 
niches. Incoherent guidelines and inconsistently applied 
laws unnecessarily hinder disease control efforts, and the 
evidence base underpinning control measures for airline-
associated infectious diseases needs to be strengthened 
considerably.
Public health involves balancing the rights of the 
majority against those of the individual, and issues 
related to air travel require particular review and 
improvement by the global health community. First, a 
systematic review should be done to appraise the 
evidence supporting control measures for transmission 
of infectious diseases via air travel. Second, airlines and 
the global health community need to invest in research 
to identify better, non-toxic insecticides, or non-chemical 
means to control insect vectors. Third, additional 
research and investment into airport health screening 
measures is required to better identify infectious 
passengers. Disease transmission can be minimised if 
passengers take appropriate precautions before or during 
a flight, or refrain from flying altogether when ill. 
Current education and communication strategies (and 
refund policies for missed flights) therefore warrant 
improvement. Fourth, these measures cannot be imple-
mented in the absence of enforceable and harmonised 
international legislation and governance. Achieving this 
goal will be a major challenge, but a starting point could 
be for international or regional bodies—such as WHO or 
the European Union—to produce model legislation or 
standards for the guidance of member states. Close 
consultation with IATA and ICAO would be required to 
develop such legislation or guidance. Enforceability 
might be encouraged by treating this as a security issue, 
similar to ensuring the mechanical safety of aircraft.
In the context of regular global air travel and evidence 
of dangerous non-endemic diseases appearing in new, 
vulnerable populations, the risks of airline-associated 
infection are growing. Potential costs or inconvenience 
to passengers and aircrews might arguably be a lesser 
evil than transmission of potentially fatal infections to 
vulnerable populations. However, without concerted 
efforts from the global health community, the threat can 
be expected to worsen.
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